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Mechanised Horsemen: Red Cavalry 
Commanders and the Second World War
Stephen Brown (University o f  Wollongong)
A casual observer could be forgiven for thinking that there were 
two Red Armies in the Second World War. By the end o f  
September 1941, the Red Army had effectively lost Ukraine, 
eastern Poland, Byelorussia, the Baltic States, much o f European 
Russia and about half o f  the five-million-strong force with which it 
began the war three months earlier. It was seemingly powerless in 
the face o f the Nazi invasion. The Red Army o f 1943-45 
reconquered all o f  this territory, albeit at the cost o f millions o f  
lives, and drove the Nazis back to Berlin achieving total victory in 
May 1945.
As for why the Red Army did so badly in 1941, there is no 
single cause. Some historians argue that superior technology gave 
the Germans an edge, others that the combat experience gained by 
the Germans in the conquest o f Western Europe in 1940 was 
decisive. Post-Stalin Soviet writers emphasised Hitler’s successful 
surprise attack. In a spectacular blunder, Stalin allowed himself to 
think that the three million foreign soldiers on his border 
represented Hitler’s way o f testing his commitment to the Nazi- 
Soviet Pact o f August 1939. The Red Army was unsure whether to 
focus its efforts upon building fortified positions at the frontier or 
to rely upon its tanks to manoeuvre against the enemy. In the 
event, the Red Army did neither and its soldiers either were killed 
or captured to no good military purpose.1
The Red Army’s rapid expansion after 1934 was not 
accompanied by the necessary increase in the number o f  competent 
officers needed to prepare the new recruits for their tasks, a 
shortfall that was exacerbated by the arrests and executions o f  the 
late 1930s.2 The Red Army was purged in 1937-38 o f its best and 
brightest officers. In their place, Stalin promoted his own buddies 
from the era o f the Russian Civil War o f  1918-20. Stalin’s choice
o f  Red Army leadership centred on the Red cavalry, an arm o f  
seivice fanatically loyal to Stalin but seemingly hopelessly out o f  
date because o f the mechanisation o f warfare.
One o f  these factors, the role o f  the Red cavalrymen, is the 
focus o f  this paper. Many commentators have criticised the 
pernicious role o f a politically loyal but militarily inept clique o f  
veteran cavalry officers who dominated the Red Army for much of 
the inter-war period and whose influence was accentuated by the 
purges. It is a staple o f  writing about the Second World War that 
the Red Army suffered from its Civil War heritage, especially its 
reliance upon cavalry.3 Stalin first attached himself to the Red 
cavalry during the Civil War, the last war in which horse and rider 
played a decisive role. It was an alliance that benefited both sides. 
Stalin was determined to build both a reputation and a support base 
in the Red Army. In Stalin, the Red cavalrymen found a valuable 
political patron. After the Civil War, Stalin and the Red 
cavalrymen advanced in tandem, each a crucial pillar o f  support 
for the other. K.E. Voroshilov was the most prominent o f  the Red 
cavalrymen, serving as Peoples Commissar for Military and Naval 
Affairs from 1925 to 1934 and as Commissar for Defence from 
1934 to 1940. Voroshilov has often been criticised as an ignoramus 
on horseback, presiding over a reactionary military establishment 
dominated by cavalrymen and unwilling to come to terms with the 
new military technology o f  tanks and aircraft.4
The influence o f  the Red cavalrymen was especially 
pronounced after the notorious military purge o f  1937-38 led to the 
arrest and execution o f  thousands o f  senior officers. The principal 
victim o f the purge was M.N. Tukhachevskii, the Red Army’s 
leading authority on mechanised war and Voroshilov’s great rival. 
Ninety per cent o f the Red Army’s most senior command was 
removed. O f the ten members o f the Chief Military Council who 
survived, seven were veterans o f the First Cavalry Army, the Civil 
War cavalry force commanded by Voroshilov and his life-long 
friend and ally, S.M. Budennyi. The cavalrymen benefited from 
the purge in that they experienced rapid promotion in the years 
1937-41. On the other hand, exercising control o f  the Red Army at 
this time was a poisoned chalice given the chaotic state o f an army 
that had suffered the loss, often permanent, o f  more than forty
thousand officers. When Voroshilov was removed from his post as 
Commissar for Defence after the costly Winter War against 
Finland in 1939-40, he had to admit to his successor that the 
situation o f the Red Army could hardly be worse.5
The disastrous performance against Finland and the 
spectacular success o f  the Nazi invasion the following year would 
seem to be convincing proof that the legacy o f the Red cavalry was 
one o f great harm to the Red Army. Nonetheless, the suggestion 
made in this paper is that the influence o f the Red cavalrymen 
should be viewed not only in terms o f the defeat o f  1941 but also 
in terms o f the victories o f  1943-45. It will be argued that 
cavalrymen played a significant part in the Red victory, that the 
majority o f  Red cavalrymen did not fit the stereotype o f  
conservative horsemen resistant to the mechanisation o f warfare, 
and that their training and outlook made them well suited to their 
new tasks when, from 1937, Red cavalrymen were redeployed in 
large numbers to the mechanised corps and other ground forces. 
They brought with them a cavalry culture that aided rather than 
hindered the Red victory.
To make this point, it is necessary first to re-examine three 
myths concerning the Red cavalry on the eve o f the Nazi invasion. 
The first myth revolves around Voroshilov and his alleged role in 
prolonging the stultifying influence o f an anachronistic Red 
cavalry. Voroshilov’s legacy to the Red Army was a complex one 
and he was guilty o f  significant errors o f judgement. Promoting a 
conservative cavalry culture was, however, not one o f  his faults.
From the evidence made available from Soviet archives, it is 
clear that Voroshilov was neither hostile to the mechanisation o f  
the Red Army nor an advocate o f the Red cavalry. The transcripts 
o f  the annual Red Army reviews conducted by the Chief Military 
Council and its predecessor reveal that Voroshilov, far from being 
obsessed with old-style cavalry warfare, was pragmatic, realistic 
and critical o f  the “Don Quixotes” as he liked to call those who 
thought that cavalry would dominate the battlefield o f the next 
war. Like nearly everyone else, Voroshilov knew that the internal 
combustion engine would supersede the horse and any nostalgia he 
might have felt for the days o f the Civil War was tempered by a 
measured appreciation o f  the significant weaknesses displayed by
the mounted arm in the war against the Poles in 1920. Voroshilov 
believed, correctly, that cavalry would have a niche role in the 
coming war but one that would support the infantry, tanks and 
planes, not substitute for them.
During his fifteen years in charge o f the Red Army, 
Voroshilov presided over and actively encouraged the 
mechanisation o f the Red Army. The Red Army could call upon 
only 100 tanks in 1928. In 1938, the Red Army boasted 15,000 
tanks, the largest tank park in the world. Meanwhile the proportion 
o f cavalry remained at the same level throughout Voroshilov’s 
tenure —  about 10 per cent o f the total —  until 1937 when it began 
to fall not just as a proportion o f the total force but in absolute 
numbers. Voroshilov often crossed swords with Tukhachevskii, 
but the debate was not about whether tanks were valuable but 
about how they should be employed.7 The Red Army developed 
the world’s first mechanised corps in 1932, an innovation that 
comprised nearly 500 tanks and 200 armoured vehicles in a single 
unit. It is true that Voroshilov was sceptical o f  massed tank corps, 
an idea championed by Tukhachevskii, and in 1939 readily 
accepted the opinion o f  the Red Army’s leading post-purge tank 
authority, D.G. Pavlov, that the mechanised corps should be 
broken up. Pavlov argued that massed tank units failed the test o f  
battle in the Spanish Civil War and eastern Poland and should be 
parcelled out as infantry support.8 Voroshilov and Pavlov were 
proved wrong on this point and the decision was quickly reversed 
in 1940, the first decision made by Voroshilov’s replacement as 
Commissar for Defence, S.K. Timoshenko. To be wrong on 
particular issues is not the same as opposing the mechanisation o f  
the Red Army.
It is worth noting that when the purge arrived in 1937, it 
came from outside the Red Army, that is, its genesis lay with 
Stalin and the NKVD. It is equally true that Voroshilov and the 
Red cavalrymen, once prompted, became enthusiastic purgers.9 
Whatever the motives for the purge, its aim was not to restore the 
cavalry to its former place o f glory. The Red cavalry halved in size 
between 1937 and 1941, at the same time as the remainder o f the 
Red Army grew rapidly.10 In other words, the purge coincided with 
a dramatic reduction in the size o f the Red cavalry and the
movement o f cavalrymen to other arms. Cavalrymen presided over 
the purge but the preservation o f the cavalry arm was obviously 
not part o f  the agenda.
While the 80,000 cavalry remaining, at least on paper, in 
1941 represented a tiny fraction o f the five million strong Red 
Army, it might be argued that this was 80,000 too many. One 
reason the cavalry survived as long as did was that even the tank’s 
most ardent supporters acknowledged its tendency to break down 
and its continuing vulnerability to enemy fire. As G.K. Zhukov 
would later recall, there was a lot to criticise about the tanks in the 
possession o f the Red Army even in 1938:
They were fast and had considerable firepower. Indeed, our 
probable adversaries had nothing to equal them in this respect in 
the same class. However, they were not manoeuvrable enough, 
vulnerable to gunfire, and broke down much too often. Besides 
they had petrol engines, which made them easily inflammable.11
A  second myth is that the Red cavalry received special treatment 
from Stalin who overvalued his Civil War experience. 
Exaggerating the importance o f the Civil War is one o f the errors 
usually attributed to Stalin and his cavalrymen allies. The Red 
cavalry, the symbol o f the Civil War, is often,described as Stalin’s 
favourite arm o f  service12 In reality, Stalin was too knowledgeable 
about modem war to be sentimental about the cavalry. When in 
April 1940 Stalin appeared at the party-military conference 
organised to review the disastrous war against Finland, the Soviet 
dictator noted that in modem war, artillery, air power and tanks 
were what counted. About the experience o f  the Civil War, Stalin 
was wholly negative. As he put it:
People are still dominated by this cult o f the traditions and 
experience of the Civil War and it deprives them of the 
psychological possibility to adjust to the new methods of waging a 
contemporary war [.. ,]13
Stalin singled out M.P. Kovalev, a former cavalryman who was 
trying to carve out a new career as an army commander:
Comrade Kovalev performed worst. As a good soldier who had 
fought in the Civil War and become a hero and gained fame, he 
found it hard to shake off the experience of the Civil War that has
become inadequate today. The traditions and experiences of the 
Civil War are absolutely inadequate and those who believe them 
adequate will certainly perish.14
Stalin was not the first to criticise the Civil War experience. Rather 
than glorifying the Civil War, it was a standard rhetorical device 
for Red Army commanders in the inter-war years to point out that 
the coming war would be nothing like the Civil War. M.V. Frunze, 
L.D. Trotsky and Voroshilov himself routinely made statements 
criticising “Civil War attitudes” just as Stalin would do in the 
quotations above. Red Army commanders lived in fear o f being 
charged with faying to re-fight the wars o f  the past.
Stalin, i f  anything, undervalued the contribution that the Civil 
War military experience might make to wars o f  the future. His tune 
only changed after the Second World War. Commentators noted 
that the Second World War repeated the pattern o f  the Civil War; 
the Red Army could not hold ground at first, was driven back 
towards Moscow but then manoeuvred successfully to punch holes 
in the defences o f an overstretched opponent. Soviet writers after 
the Second World War often drew comparisons between the 
cavalry o f the Civil War and the tank operations o f 1941-45. With 
its sixteen thousand sabres and its supporting cast o f  infantry, 
artillery and machine guns, the First Cavalry Army constituted, for 
Soviet writers, an example o f strategic cavalry, that is, capable o f  
operating independently on the broader theatre o f  war and not 
limited, like most other cavalry, to reconnaissance, battlefield 
charges, pursuits and raids.
After the Second World War, Stalin’s propagandists even 
claimed that the operations o f the First Cavalry Army, by 
combining mobility, firepower and mass to outflank and encircle 
the enemy, was the real basis for the concept o f  Deep Operations 
in the 1930s and the successful tank battles o f the Second World 
War.15 While the connection between cavalry operations in the 
Civil War and tank operations in the Second World War was 
exaggerated in order to avoid any mention o f  Tukhachevskii’s role, 
these post-war claims suggest that the value o f the Civil War as a 
laboratory for war in the future almost certainly was 
underestimated rather than exaggerated before 1941. P.A.
Rotmistrov, a former cavalryman and celebrated tank commander 
in the Second World War, summed up this view when he praised 
the experience o f  the cavalry in the Civil War, especially its 
characteristic:
massing in the decisive direction, sudden and quick blows using 
manoeuvre, seizing the flanks with the aim of ensuring his 
complete defeat. These principles lay at the basis of the working 
out of a theory of using new means of struggle, tank warfare.16
A  third myth is the prevalent idea that cavalrymen are by definition 
conservative because their arm seems to change so little with the 
passage o f  time. The popular image o f  the European cavalryman 
after the Napoleonic Wars was that o f  a pampered aristocrat 
clinging to an outdated mode o f  warfare. The image captures only 
part o f the story o f an arm o f  service that made strenuous efforts to 
modernise. This was true especially o f  the tsar’s cavalry. The 
Russian cavalry was the first to remodel itself on the basis o f  the 
lessons o f  the American Civil War o f  1861-65, training to engage 
the enemy both mounted and dismounted and to make more use o f  
firepower to complement the more traditional mass formation 
charges. These lessons did not enable the cavalry to impose its 
stamp upon the trench warfare o f the First World War but would 
prove invaluable in the Russian Civil War.
Budennyi and Voroshilov’s First Cavalry Army was the 
largest and most successful unit o f  Red cavalry in the Civil War. 
Budennyi would later find himself saddled with a reputation as a 
cavalry conservative. However, in the Civil War, Budennyi was 
criticised by his opponents for sullying the reputation o f the 
cavalry with his unorthodox tactics o f  refusing to charge and 
instead relying upon firepower to win battles.17 Having failed to 
attract sufficient numbers o f tsarist officers or Cossacks, groups 
that gravitated towards the anti-Bolshevik White movement in the 
Civil War, the Red cavalry made a virtue out o f necessity by using 
the firepower o f  revolvers and machine guns to neutralise the 
White advantage in horsemanship and swordplay. Budennyi’s 
cavalrymen preferred the revolver to the sword and became expert 
in using machine guns mounted on peasant carts to soften up their 
opponents.
In summer 1920, the First Cavalry Army moved rapidly 
across Ukraine and into southern Poland. When battles went to 
•plan, they followed the pattern noted by an American observer:
Budennyi invariably tried encircling movements in order to reach 
the rear of the opponent without fighting. If he ran into opposition, 
he did not persist but tried elsewhere [...] Having four divisions at 
his disposal, he could feel the line at different points with part of 
his force while the remainder was in reserve, ready to exploit a 
success [...] In this method of handling cavalry, Budennyi may be 
regarded almost as a model to be followed.18
This cost-effective manoeuvring worked only part o f the time. 
Casualties overall were high, a fact that is not surprising given that 
the Poles, in particular, had modem weapons, including air power. 
In the case o f the Polish campaign, ten thousand cavalrymen, more 
than half the initial force, were out o f action after four months o f  
fighting.19 In the words o f Isaac Babel, the celebrated short-story 
writer who served under Budennyi, to fight with the First Cavalry 
Army was to attend “a huge, never-ending service for the dead”.20 
The tank armies o f  the Second World War would fight on these 
same battlefields and faithfully repeat this pattern of continual 
movement despite appalling casualties.
During the 1920s and 1930s, cavalry was neither the 
pampered child o f  the Red Army nor a stagnant backwater. It was 
not enough for the cavalryman to know how to ride, shoot and take 
care o f his horse, though these tasks were difficult enough. Cavalry 
was under constant pressure to improve its performance, to master 
dismounted action in the 1920s and to work closely with tanks and 
aircraft in the 1930s. Precisely because they were constantly under 
attack as anachronistic, the cavalrymen knew that they had to 
justify their existence or be pensioned off. It was an arm that 
prided itself on initiative and independence, important qualities in 
a Stalinist setting that was too often characterised by routine and 
conformity. Theirs was a Sisyphean task for there was simply no 
way to make cavalry sufficiently safe from bullet and shell to 
satisfy the critics.
The pressure did not come simply from well-known critics 
such as Tukhachevskii or V.K. Triandifillov.21 Until the purges, 
the Red Army command was home to lively debate and criticism
concerning the performance o f the various arms. In 1928, I.E. Iakh- 
told Budennyi that he “should not curse people who only desire 
good to the cavalry. We must make radical changes in terms of 
getting the cavalry’s weapons right and in terms o f  cooperation 
with infantry. The cavalry costs us millions and we will simply 
have to shoot it in time o f war.”22 A.S. Bubnov, who formerly 
served with the First Cavalry Army, agreed, claiming that “if  the 
government viewed a proper evaluation o f  the cavalry, it would 
ask us why are we wasting the money” 23 On this occasion, 
Budennyi’s only comeback was to insist that “in war-time, we will 
show you”.24
For cavalrymen passionately committed to then arm, the 
hope was to prove their critics wrong. They could take comfort in 
the fact that in 1928, there was no real possibility o f abandoning 
cavalry altogether. In the absence o f  sufficient numbers o f  tanks 
and armoured vehicles, cavalry remained the principal means o f  
mobility on the battlefield and the wider theatre o f war. In the 
1920s, the Red cavalry attempted to display its expertise in 
firepower, to be effective fighting dismounted and mounted and to 
protect itself from air attack. In the 1930s the new Soviet strategy 
o f Deep Battle incorporated cavalrymen who were to work 
alongside the tanks in penetrating the deep rear o f the enemy. The 
principal trend in the 1930s was the attempt to create a 
“mechanised” or “armoured” cavalry that would work in tandem 
with the mechanised corps.
The pressures upon the Red cavalrymen did not let up. In 
1936, for example, Voroshilov complained that “the horse is too 
vulnerable to the air, to enemy firepower and to chemical warfare, 
so much so that it will be difficult for the cavalry to wage war at 
aH” 25 cavapy division already had an artillery regiment, a 
tank regiment and was well equipped with machine guns. The next 
step, Voroshilov proposed, was to get rid o f one o f the three 
cavalry regiments and replace it with an infantry-machine gun 
regiment. The following year, the cavalry commanders themselves 
acknowledged how difficult it was to defend itself against air 
attack. Their demand was for an anti-aircraft division using tank 
tracks that would keep up with the cavalry. Cavalry meanwhile had 
to focus its attention on movement at night, the only avenue it had
to avoid detection from the air. Changes to the cavalry’s 
organization and tactics were sometimes implemented successfully 
and sometimes revised or shelved altogether. What was constant 
was the frantic race to find a winning formula for the beleaguered 
horsemen. For some, the sensible response was to admit defeat but, 
according to Zhukov, for the best and brightest o f  the cavalrymen, 
the challenge was to prepare better for modem war.
As Inspector o f  Cavalry, Budennyi was indefatigable in his 
efforts to publicise the virtues o f the Red cavalry even i f  that 
meant denigrating its rival, the tank. Budennyi could barely 
contain his glee when at the review o f 1936, he was able to seize 
upon a report that “the speed o f tanks is a concern because in 
mountain conditions the tank only moves at one and a half 
kilometres an hour”. Budennyi noted that “at that rate, it will be 
vulnerable not only to artillery but to spears”.26 Yet even Budennyi 
effectively surrendered in 1937 when he accepted promotion out o f  
the cavalry to the command o f the Moscow Military District. 
Budennyi’s legacy was not a nineteenth-century cavalry capable 
only o f charges and sabre rattling but a mounted force that would 
have been unrecognisable even to those who fought in the Civil 
War. On the eve o f the Nazi invasion, a standard cavalry division, 
apart from its 9,240 cavalrymen, comprised thirty-four tanks, 
eighteen armoured vehicles and 136 pieces o f artillery. Far from 
being cocooned from the realities o f modem war, Red cavalrymen 
were well acquainted with their inevitable replacement, the tank.
The Red cavalry therefore was dynamic out o f necessity, 
more undervalued than overvalued and treated with much more 
scepticism by its military and political masters than most 
commentators recognise. Most importantly, it produced some good 
soldiers. It is certainly true that former cavalrymen were in charge 
o f the Red Army that was defeated in 1941. When the Nazis 
invaded, Stalin placed his trusted cavalrymen in command o f the 
Soviet frontier. Voroshilov commanded the North-West Front at 
Leningrad, S.K. Timoshenko was in charge o f the West Front at 
Minsk and Budennyi led the South-West Front protecting Kiev. 
Like the Red Army as a whole, the veterans o f the First Cavalry 
Army failed in their efforts to repel this devastating attack.
On the other hand, it was a younger generation o f  former 
cavalrymen who commanded the Red Army when it was winning. 
The turning-point battle o f  the Second World War was Stalingrad 
in 1942-43. Three o f  the principal Red commanders at Stalingrad 
were G.K. Zhukov, K.K. Rokossovksii and A.I. Eremenko. All 
three were recycled Red cavalrymen who attended the Leningrad 
Cavalry School together in 1924 and later made a successful 
transition to command mechanised units. Arguably, the most 
famous and successful soldier o f the Second World War was 
Stalin’s wartime Deputy Commissar for Defence, Zhukov. Zhukov 
was trained as a cavalryman, fought in the Civil War and even 
commanded the Fourth Cavalry Division, formerly the spearhead 
o f the First Cavalry Army. He left the cavalry only in 1939 when 
he fought the Japanese in the Far East. In his memoirs, Zhukov 
pointed out that his transition from Red cavalryman to Soviet 
marshal was not a fluke. Because o f its prestige from the Civil 
War, the cavalry attracted many o f the best and brightest 
volunteers.27
Zhukov and his classmates were the advance guard for a large 
posse o f  Red cavalrymen whose careers were transformed in the 
years leading up to the Second World War. After 1939 whole 
corps and divisions o f  cavalry became the basis for new  
mechanised units.28 The migration o f cavalrymen to the tank corps 
was testimony to the versatility o f the cavalrymen but also to the 
fact that the Red cavalry suffered relatively minor losses during the 
purges compared to the situation elsewhere in the Red Army.29
The Red Army suffered from two great disruptions in the 
1930s. Until the early 1930s, the size o f  the Red Army was about 
half a million men. In response to the deteriorating international 
situation, the regular Red Army in 1935 was required to integrate
400,000 extra soldiers. In 1936, the Red Army increased by a 
further 50 per cent or 400,000 more men. By 1939, there were 
more than three million in the Red Army and that figure would rise 
to more than five million two years later.30 The Red Army simply 
could not find officers to cope with the expansion. By 1935 the 
Red Army needed 130,000 officers but were 17,000 officers short. 
At the end o f 1938, the Red Army was more than ninety thousand 
short o f the number o f  officers it required.31
The purge made the task o f properly leading the Red Army 
even more impossible. According to the most recent estimates, 
some 44,000 officers were arrested and 15,000 o f  these were 
executed.32 It goes without saying that the purges were a disaster 
for the Red Army and in particular for its leadership. But it would 
have been worse had there not been a pool o f unpurged cavalry 
commanders to employ to lead the reconstituted mechanised corps 
o f the post-purge era. The Red cavalry represented an oasis o f  
stability, the core around which the Red command could rebuild. 
In 1940, four o f nine new mechanised corps found themselves 
under the command o f  former cavalrymen.33
It is difficult to know exactly how many cavalrymen moved 
from the cavalry to other arms. The purges and the outbreak o f war 
coincided with dramatic reductions in the size o f  the cavalry arm. 
In 1937, the Red cavalry counted seven cavalry corps and thirty- 
two divisions. In June 1941, only four cavalry corps and thirteen 
divisions remained, in other words, less than half the number o f  
Red cavalry four years earlier.34 The thirteen divisions in 1941 
required 6,000 commanders.35 Thus at least that number, that is,
6,000 cavalry commanders, were made redundant in the years 
1937-41. Some moved sideways within the Red cavalry, some left 
the Red Army and some were purged. It is most likely that the 
majority migrated to the infantry and tank forces. Many more 
would follow after the Nazi invasion.36 The Red cavalry produced 
fifteen marshals and countless senior officers who made their mark 
on battlefields from the Caucasus to Berlin.37
The impact o f the Red cavalryman upon the performance o f  
the Red Army in the Second World War needs further 
investigation. It is often remarked that the Red Army in 1941 
showed none o f  the verve and determination it would display later 
in the war.38 The former cavalrymen, like the rest o f  the Red 
Army, started slowly as they grappled with new battlefield 
challenges. The longer the war went, the more familiar the 
situation must have seemed to those who fought, or Carefully 
studied, the experience o f  the Red cavalry in the Civil War. 
Holding ground at the frontier is not normally a task for 
cavalrymen. Theirs was a world o f  manoeuvre against an 
overextended enemy, o f rapid movement and self-sacrificing
determination when cornered. The situation o f  1943 was every bit 
as desperate as that o f  1941. On the other hand, the longer the war 
went, the more it came to resemble the type o f operations for 
which Red cavalrymen had trained for twenty years. The former 
cavalrymen appeared less demoralised than other parts o f  the Red 
Army, perhaps because the purge touched them less but also 
because they had long viewed themselves as a committed elite, 
whatever the critics might say about the decline o f the cavalry. 
They were confident in each other, proud o f  their cavalry identity 
and well versed in responding to change.
It is probably fair to say that historians find it easier to 
explain the desperate situation in which the Red Army found itself 
in 1941 compared to the equally important question o f how the 
Red Army rescued itself from the brink in 1943-45. The unhappy 
legacy o f a powerful and anachronistic cavalry faction is a standard 
part o f the story told about the Red Army in 1937-41. The 
argument here is that the cavalrymen should be looked upon in a 
different light. The Red cavalrymen proved to be competent and 
adaptable soldiers when redeployed in infantry or tank corps, a not 
surprising outcome given their Civil War and inter-war experience. 
Trained as an elite and to respect both mobility and firepower, the 
former Red cavalrymen were well prepared not for past wars but 
for wars o f  the future and were more than adequate raw material 
for a reconstituted and ultimately successful Red Army.
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